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HISTORY OF THE 505TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT
Copyright 1998 Samuel E. Kimpton All rights reserved
USed with permision of Sam kimpton

The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment was constituted on 24 June 1942 and activated under Airborne Command on 6 July of the same year at Fort Benning Georgia. In distinction from other units it was not built up from other pre-existing organizations rather it was formed "from scratch". Upon completion of jump and paratrooper training in Georgia and Alabama it was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division on 10 February, 1943 and moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, two days later.

On 21 March the Regiment moved to camp Edwards Massachusetts for stageing for overseas deployment and on 28 April left New York, Point of Embarkation, for North Africa. On 10 May the 505th arrived at Casablanca. A period of intense training in which jumps at drop zones near Oudja, Moroco were conducted. These DZ's were set up to replicate the areas in which the 505th would jump. Testing and refinement of the combat loads to be carried by indivual troopers also took place. By 4 July the Regiment had again moved to Kairouan, Tunisia where it staged for its first combat deployment to occur somewhere in Europe.


Riggers of the 505th loading A-5 aerial delivery containers
onto a C-47 in preparation for a training mission at Oudja.


On 9 July 1943, just over a year since completing its training and assignment to the 82nd Airborne division the 505th formed the spearhead of the American Forces in the invasion of Sicily.

The Airborne component of the invasion was actually devided into four parts. A British glider assault just south of Syracuse on the east coast of the Island, code named "Ladbroke", was to be the initial assault in the invasion. The 505th was to assault the area just above the invasion beaches at Gela. This operation was code named "Husky I". A second assault, code named "Husky II", was to reinforce the 505th after the beachheads were secured. This was tentatively scheduled for 11, July. The final operation, code named "Fustian", consisted of an assault by the Britiish 1st Parachute Brigade on the East coast of the island and was scheduled for 13 July.

As the 505th Parachute Combat Team (Reinforced). The Airborne Assualt Force for "Husky I" totaled 3,405 Troopers and included the following elements:

• The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment



• The 3rd Battalion 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment



• The 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion



• Company B 307th Airborne Engineer battalion



• Signal, Medical, Air Support, and Naval Support Detachments

227 C-47 Transport aircraft were required to deliver the combat team and were supplied by the 52nd Troop Carrier Group. To reduce the number of trained navigators required for the operation these aircraft were organized in 9 ship formations. Each serial would consist of about 52 aircraft. Each flight would be seperated by 1.5 minutes The resulting collumn would be 36 miles long.

The invasion plan stipulated that the airborne force be dropped between the enemy strongpoint at Caltagirone and the 1st Infantry Division invasion Beaches at Gela. Among the principal objectives were:

• The Siezure of Key Terrain south of Niscemi for use as an airhead



• The interdiction of enemy movement from Caltagirone to the invasion beaches.



• The disruption of enemy communication.



• Denial of enemy access to the airfield at Ponto Olivio



• The destruction of a network of sixteen mutually supporting fortifications at "area Y" (See Map).



• The Siezure and Blockage of The road at "area X" (See Map).


Upon contact with the 1st ID the regiment was to participate in the remainder of the campaign for the island, being built up by succesive air and sea lifts.

The timing of the operation was to precede the landing of the amphibious forces by three and one half hours. the Target date was contingent upon the lunar phase. On 10 July the moon would be a waxing gibbous phase (not quite full). This would allow enough natural illumination for for both the flight to the drop zones and the actual drops themselves. all of this of would occur prior to moonset. There would still be several hours of darkness after moonset during which the assembly and reorganization of the Combat Team would take place. This was selected as D-Day for the Invasion. This was to be the first mass delivery of airborne personnel by parachute into combat in military history.


The pilots of the 52nd Troop Carrier Group were briefed on their flight plans. In order to avoid detection by enemy radio detection finders the entire flight was to be conducted in close formation at 200 feet above sea level over a ciruitous 415 mile route. The only exception to this would be during the form up phjase of the flight (under 1,000 feet) and the drop phase (600 feet) Moreover blackout was to be observed for the duration. The transports were to form up over Kairouan and proceed southeast to Chergui Island, Then east to Linosa Island; a small (2.1 square mile) volcanic island in the Mediterranean. After Linosa the aircraft was to proceed eastward to Malta. At Malta a signal flare would be fired by the lead ship which would be answered by the brief and intermitant activation of a signal light on the Island. Upon recieving this signal the pilots were to proceed northwards to the vicinity of Isola Della Carrenti; an island at the extreme southeast corner of Sicily. At this second waypoint they were to proceed northwest off the southern coast of the island reamining out to sea in order to prevent being detected and fired upon by Axis shore batteries. At the mouth of the Acate River the troop carriers were to turn right, move inland, climb to 600 feet, and then give the green light to the troops after clearing Biviere Pond; the final waypoint north of the river and just south of the DZ. After completeing this phase of the Mission the Aircraft were to return to Tunisia.

The time to the Drop Zone from Kairouan would be aproximately 3.5 hours under the best possible conditions. The drop zone itself was a relatively low area on the gulf of Gela situated in otherwise mountainous terrain.

Sea Rescue Service was alerted to respond in the event that any of the aircraft were to "ditch" in the Mediterranean Sea. The personel on board were issued "Mae West" life preservs and the aircraft themselves would float for a significant period unless heavily damaged.

Prior to emplaning for the trip the following statement was distributed to all personel within the organization On 9 July:


"Soldiers of the 505th Combat Team"

"Tonight you embark on a combat mission for which our people and the free people of the world have been waiting for two years."

"You will be spearheading the landing of an American Force upon the island of SICILY. Every preparation has been made to eliminate the element of chance. You have been given the means to do the job and you are backed by the largest assemblage of air power in the world's history."

"The eyes of the world are on you. The hopes and prayers of every american go with you."

"Since it is our first fight at night you must use the countersign and avoid firing on each other. The bayonet is the night fighters best weapon. Conserve your water and ammunition."

"The term American Parachutist has become synonymous with courage of a high order. Let us carry the fight to the enemy and make American Parachutists feared and respected through all his ranks. Attack violently. destroy him whenever found."

"I know you will do your job."

Good landing, good fight, and good luck."

..........................................................................James M. Gavin

The final field order also stipulated that all personell were to drop on Sicily regardless of any possible failure to find the prescribed DZ by any given pilot. No one was to return until the mission was completed.


The first complication in the operational plan came with the news of adverse weather conditions. Colonel Gavin the Unit Commander was informed that the Drop Zone was experiencing 35 mile per hour westerly winds. This information was not made available to him until he had boarded the command aircraft for embarkation on the assault.

Training drops are routinely cancelled when wind speeds at the DZ obtain a value of 15 MPH. This is to reduce injuries experienced during the jump. Winds also tend to affect the ability of aircraft to maintain formation and can impact navigation.



The transports began there takeoff from Kairouan at 20:35 (8:35 P.M.) on the evening of the 9th.

Many of the C-47's did not find there waypoints. Linosa, the first waypoint after forming up is a very small island with a maximum elevation point of only 300 meters and thus very difficult to see when flying at 200 feet. Many of the aircraft reported that they never did see this island. Many missed Malta as well. Those which did see the island did not see the expected signal identifying the waypoint as they were in the wrong area.

In the vast majority of cases the left turn to intercept the island of sicily was made based on time calculation alone and occured too late. They overshot the second waypoint by a significant distance owing to the strong tailwind.

According to a number of accounts landfall on the Island of sicily was as confusing an experience as finding the waypoints. Many of the transports found themselves on the east coast of the Island. and the jumpmasters reporting siting land to the left of their aircraft. It should have been on the right. 23 sticks of 3/504th PIR were dropped in the area South of Syracuse about 60 miles from their intended DZ. Other aircraft realizing the error turned back out to sea and flew with the coast line to the left of their ships until such time as they felt they were near the intended destination.

The above map is intended to illustrate the actual flight paths of the transports. It should be noted that these paths are oversimplified as shown but do convey the general nature of them.



TO BE CONTINUED